

Burke-Caldwell January 2020



Let's look at the numbers



Know what's **below.**
Call before you dig.



Locate Requests & Transmissions for all of North Carolina

Dec. 2019 vs 2018

Tickets

2019: 140,576

2018: 135,072

Difference: 4.07%

Transmissions

2019: 814,379

2018: 751,039

Difference: 8.4%

Year-to-date

Tickets

2019: 2,222,729

2018: 2,012,022

Difference: 10.5%

Transmissions

2019: 12,211,179

2018: 10,988,418

Difference: 11.1%



County Ticket Volume

YTD stats compared with previous year

Burke	3 HR	CNCL	NEW	RXMT	UPDT	Total Tickets
2018	192	104	8404	183	2393	11276
2019	533	99	8761	253	3506	13152
+/- Var	177.6%	-4.8%	4.2%	38.3%	46.5%	16.6%
				Locates per day		57



County Ticket Volume

YTD stats compared with previous year

Caldwell	3 HR	CNCL	NEW	RXMT	UPDT	Total Tickets
2018	282	76	7510	245	3052	11165
2019	709	94	8812	430	2526	12571
+/- Var	151.4%	23.7%	17.3%	75.5%	-17.2%	12.6%
+/- Var				Locates per day		54

County Ticket Volume

2019 Stats Compared with 2018

Burke	3 HR	CNCL	NEW	RXMT	UPDT	Total Tickets
2018	8	3	378	8	184	581
2019	27	6	523	15	426	997
+/- Var	237.5%	100.0%	38.4%	87.5%	131.5%	71.6%
				Locates per day		45



County Ticket Volume

2019 Stats Compared with 2018

Caldwell	3 HR	CNCL	NEW	RXMT	UPDT	Total Tickets
2018	25	3	438	10	166	642
2019	13	6	482	13	99	613
+/- Var	-48.0%	100.0%	10.0%	30.0%	-40.4%	-4.5%
				Locates per day		28



County Ticket Distribution



BURKE	997
CONNELLY SPRINGS	186
HICKORY	98
HILDEBRAN	15
ICARD	19
JONAS RIDGE	18
MORGANTON	463
VALDESE	163

County Ticket Distribution



CALDWELL	613
GRANITE FALLS	168
HICKORY	38
HUDSON	57
LENOIR	309



For more info visit

<https://www.duke-energy.com/community/customer-assistance-programs/share-the-warmth>

A horizontal, textured red brushstroke with irregular, feathered edges, centered on a white background. The stroke is a vibrant red color and has a slightly grainy, painterly appearance.

UPCOMING EVENTS

NC811 Upcoming Holiday Schedule

- **New Years Day: January 1st**
- ***Martin Luther King Jr's Birthday: January 20th**

All above holidays are excluded from the three working day notice.

** Denotes Observed Holidays. NC811 will be open to accept all locate requests on observed holidays. The observed holiday is excluded from the three working day notice as well.*

A photograph of a modern conference room. A long, light-colored conference table is surrounded by black leather chairs. The room is brightly lit, and the background shows a window with a view of a city skyline.

BOARD MEETING

4Q19

January 17, 2020
Grandover Resort
Greensboro, NC

For booking info:
Tonya Hargraves:
tonya@nc811.org

NC Underground Damage Prevention Review Board

Location:

*Dempsey E. Benton Water Treatment Plant
2301 Benson Rd., Garner, NC*

January 14, 2020

10am to 4pm



<https://www.nc811.org/report-a-violation.html>



NC Locate Resolution

Partnership Committee

Every 2 months on the third Wednesday
NC 811, 5009 High Point Rd, Greensboro, NC

- **Wednesday, February 5th**
11:00am – 1:00pm





State UCC Meeting

North Carolina 811

5009 High Point Road, Greensboro

Tuesday, January 14, 2020

10:00am – 12:00pm



*The NC811 Education
Department is here to help you!*



A PDF of this presentation is available at www.ncucc.org

Use the UCC Issues form to voice your concerns to both local and state level UCC meetings in North Carolina. Available on both the NCUCC website and the NC811 app.

Dwaine Caldwell UCC Meeting

UCC Sign-In Sheet

County: _____

Date: _____

1/14/2020

6890

Name	Company	Email	Phone Number
Brian Morehouse	NC 811	Bmorehouse@nc811.org	336-482-6890
Jennifer Henderson	Heath	jennifer.henderson@heathus.com	980-613-1579
Dwaine Spencer	Heath	dwaine.spencer@heathus.com	980-425-1620
* Christopher Fre	Heath	christopher.fre@heathus.com	(980) 286-2357
Michelle Flowers	NCUC	mflowers@ncuc.net	919-418-4558
Jeremy Hussey	USIC	jeremyhussey@usic.com	704-441-4631
MAX CHAPMAN	Brentwood		
ROBERT TURNER	"		
Ralph E Johnson	Brentwood	Ralphelen670@yahoo	828-334-4486
Troy Houser	Brentwood	thehouser@charter.net	828 430 1984
DAVID POORE	WEST CONSULTANTS	dpoore@west-consultants.com	433-5661
David Wortman	Town of Rhodhiss	Wortman.dave@gmail.com	
KEN SUTTLES	SUTTLES SURVEYING	KEN@SUTTLESSURVEY.COM	CELL 828-231-8290
Tommy Chapman	Rutherford EMC	tchapman@REMC.com	828-584-1410
John Leger	Rutherford College	Public works @ Rutherford College nc.us	828-391-4757
DOUG SUTTLES	SUTTLES SURVEYING PA	doug@suttlessurvey.com	828-652-9382
Roger Allen	Morganton	SteeTer20013@gmail.com	828-448-0894
Ronnie Suttles	Morganton	rsuttles@ci.morganton-nc.us	
TRAE PRICE	Morganton	TPrice@ci.morganton-nc.us	
KEVIN PRITCHARD	City of Lenoir	Kpritchard@ci.Lenoir.NC.us	828 850 5864
* Derek Goble	City of Lenoir	Dgoble@ci.Lenoir.NC.us	828-750-5049
* Beth McMahan	City of Lenoir	bmcmahan@ci.Lenoir.NC.us	828-757-2154
* Tracy Huffman	City of Lenoir	thuffman@ci.Lenoir.nc.us	828-750-0487
William Dennis	Town of Rhodhiss	rdchief361@yahoo.com	828-312-0082



US DOT PHMSA Accident Investigation Division

Situational Awareness for Employees: SAFE Bulletin

Potential for First and Second Party Excavation Damage to Pipelines

49 CFR Parts 192 and 195

Summary: The Pipeline and Hazardous Safety Materials Administration's (PHMSA) Accident Investigation Division (AID) is issuing this SAFE bulletin to provide inspectors notification of seven pipeline incidents caused by first and/or second party excavation damage. Excavation damage is a leading cause of incidents. First party excavation damage refers to incidents caused by a direct employee of the operator. Second party excavation damage refers to incidents caused by the operator's contractor, subcontractor, agent, or other party working on behalf of the operator. Third party excavation damage refers to incidents caused by personnel who do not work for or on behalf of the pipeline operator. Relatively few excavation damage incidents are caused by first and second party. AID performs data analysis to identify national pipeline incident trends or novel causes. The number of first and second party incidents is trending slightly upward and have resulted in injuries and fatalities.

First and second party excavation damages are particularly egregious since they are within an operator's control and are always preventable. Gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipeline first and second party damages occur on property controlled by the operator or in a pipeline right-of-way. First and second party incidents involve hazard barriers that were removed or compromised. Damage prevention hazard barriers, prescribed in One-Call laws and damage prevention program requirements, are implemented via an operator's written procedures. First and second party damage may be the result of inadequate procedures or not following procedures. Two-thirds of these accidents involve excavation using a backhoe and one third of the time excavators did not maintain clearances or use hand tools where required. Operators have a broad requirement to make construction records, maps, and operating history available to operating personnel. One-third of first and second party events involve damage to appurtenances to the pipeline such as thread-o-rings (TOR), gauge lines, and tubing. Appurtenances may be on as-built drawings and inline inspection data. Additionally, AID's investigations found instances where operators did not follow proper management of change when making field changes - additions or subtractions - to the scope of the work.

Some investigations in this bulletin are on-going, yet early findings may be pertinent to inspection of an operator's damage prevention program and an operator's need to focus on internal practices and procedures to address the issues and ensure remediation. While there are not as many first party (very few) and second party damages (more) as there are third party (most) caused accidents, it is important for operators to remember that they are not immune from causing excavation damage. Operators should review their contract workforce



excavation practices to ensure the workforce has access to resources needed to prevent second party damage and are following the operator's procedures. Operators should review their oversight of contractor excavation. Additionally, this material may be useful for PHMSA's Training and Qualification and PHMSA's Damage Prevention Team for enforcement of State One-Call laws.

For Further Information, Contact: Peter Katchmar @ 405-686-2060 or Peter.Katchmar@dot.gov.

Supplemental Information:


I. Background

Seldom do operators or their contractor's fail to protect their own infrastructure. First and second party incidents involve removed or compromised hazard barriers. These failures usually have multiple contributing factors including:

- Maps and alignment sheets not made available or reviewed by field personnel prior to excavation.
- Maps are inadequate, outdated, or missing records.
- Appurtenances protrude from the pipeline. Fittings or taps may be welded or installed on the pipeline to facilitate drain up, purging, introduction of water for a hydrostatic pressure test, blow down, extension/take off from pipeline, corrosion coupon monitoring, thermometer wells, gauge adapters, and other instrument probes. Excavators may not know or realize that there is a TOR installed or it may not be shown on the alignment sheet. Gauge lines and stubs are also susceptible to being hit and may not be mapped.
- Operator or contractor may not follow operator's excavation procedures. Excavator continues digging without a spotter present or may not follow special procedures for hand digging within the tolerance zone because they "*know exactly where the pipe is.*"
- Excavators may rely on historical knowledge of field staff or line markers. Existing line markers can have an offset and are unreliable for knowing the location of a pipeline.
- Expansion of work scope in the field without due diligence or proper use of equipment, maps, records and operator approvals.
- Environmental conditions preventing visibility of the pipeline. Precipitation can create wet and muddy conditions where the pipe is submerged and not easily observable.
- Contractor may not be provided with operator's excavation procedures.
- Contractor may allow a non-qualified person operate the excavation equipment.



First and Second Party Excavation Damage Data Analysis - Between January 2010 and May 2019, 92 excavation damage reported incidents with the subtype cause of Operator/Contractor Excavation Damage resulted in 3 fatalities, 14 injuries, and \$28M in damages. The total number of first and second party excavation damage incidents (GD+GT+HL) is trending slightly upward.



The table below includes statistics from 30-Day Reports about all reported incidents by year:

First and Second Party Excavation Damage Incidents¹				
Year	# Incidents	# Fatalities	# Injuries	Total Cost
2010	9	0	0	\$659,489
2011	7	0	6	\$1,493,472
2012	5	0	0	\$785,250
2013	13	1	0	\$7,015,926
2014	10	0	3	\$3,284,395
2015	13	0	0	\$1,493,115
2016	8	2	4	\$4,003,777
2017	14	0	1	\$5,287,099
2018	10	0	0	\$2,825,899
2019	3	0	0	\$1,363,542
Total	92	3	14	\$28,211,964

Two-thirds of these incidents involved excavation using backhoes (63), followed by boring/directional drilling equipment (16). In six incidents, there was no One-call ticket and in

¹ Note that several of the incidents investigated described below are not included in the data because the cause subtype on the 30-day report was other than Operator/Contractor Excavation Damage so is not reflected in these statistics. The cause subtype was Previous Damage Due to Excavation or Other Outside Damage but the damage was caused by first or second party. The incident in Helena, AL Report # 20160391 is included in the statistics but on the 30-Day Report is categorized as 'Unknown' cause since the NTSB investigation is ongoing.



21 incidents the facilities were not marked. Locates were performed about equally by the contractor and the operator. The breakdown of the incident's cause:

Excavation practices not sufficient	60
Locating practices not sufficient	20
Data not collected or other	11
One-call notification practices not sufficient	1

The breakdown of insufficient excavation practices:

Failure to use hand tools where required	17
Failure to maintain clearance	17
Excavation practices not sufficient (other)	11
Failure to verify location by test-hole (pot-holing)	9
Improper backfilling	4
Failure to maintain the marks	2

Accident Investigation Summaries:

PHMSA's Accident Investigation Division (AID), State Programs, and NTSB investigated the following first and second party excavation damage incidents:

1. Auburn Hills, MI – Report not filed

On May 21, 2019, a pipeline operator was in the process of lowering a shallow gas distribution main. While trenching along-side the main, the operator damaged a previously exposed but recovered tee. As the operator excavated to isolate the releasing gas, they hit an electric line that was running parallel to the gas main. The electricity ignited the natural gas causing one injury (employee - hospitalized). The utilities were reported to have been marked prior to this first party incident.

2. Dix, IL – Report not filed

On May 16, 2019, an operator's contractor (second party) stuck and damaged a service line upstream of a farm tap while excavating for an integrity management verification dig. The contractor had a locate request, but the locate markings may not have indicated the actual location of the gas line.

3. Decatur, IN – Report #20180293

In September 2018, a pipeline operator's contractor (second party) installed water-inflated dams, known as bladder dams, (Figure 1) over the top of an 8" pipeline to facilitate an anomaly dig on a parallel 12" product line in the St. Mary's River. In preparation for placement of the bladder dams, the contractor cleaned the river bottom of brush, trees and mud with a backhoe. The backhoe scraped and dented an 8" pipe while the pipeline was not in operation (Figure 2). During the next product shipment, while at operating pressure, the 8" pipeline ruptured releasing 195 barrels of jet fuel.



Figure 1 Bladder Dam Installation

installation of the bladder dams showed no evidence of mechanical damage on the 8" pipeline in this area. This report is not included in the incident statistic summary because it was reported as Other Outside Force Damage.

PHMSA's investigation is ongoing but evidence indicates the operator's contractor allowed a non-qualified individual to operate the backhoe to clean out the river bottom who damaged the pipe prior to installing the bladder dams.

4. Near Oklahoma City, OK - Report # 20180087

In February 2018, a pipe failed under a retention pond near Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and released 3,381 barrels of crude oil. The failure location was the site of a previous in-line inspection anomaly repair. The metallurgical examination concluded that failure was caused by mechanical damage from the tooth of an excavator track hoe. No injuries, fatalities, or fires were associated with this second party excavation damage incident.

Incident Timeline:

- 2013 – Anomalies identified during inline inspection.
- November 2016 – Operator's contractor excavates pipe segment and operator employees installed three steel sleeves at site of anomalies.
- February 17, 2018 - Pipeline operator identifies a release on their pipeline. The operator immediately initiated shut down and dispatched field personnel to investigate. Field personnel visually confirmed the release on February 18, 2018.

The metallurgical analysis indicated that the pipeline failed because of top side mechanical damage that resulted in deformation and denting of the pipe. The failure initiated at a re-rounding crack, that was likely at least 0.043 inches (21% of nominal wall thickness) deep, located within the deformation. Smart pig data from before the



Figure 2 - Excavation Damage from Backhoe



Operator’s Investigation

The operator interviewed field personnel who were onsite during the 2016 repair as to excavation and backfill techniques and their recollection of damage to the pipe. None recalled the pipeline being damaged during the repair. A photograph taken after the sleeves were installed but before backfill, showed no visual damage to the pipe prior to backfill. Further, an examination of the 811 logs between November 2016 and February 2018 and aerial patrol imagery between September 2013 and February 2018, did not identify excavation within the operator’s right of way near the failure site.

The operator conducted a visual examination of the damage and removed what appeared to be a coating repair, subsequently referred to as ‘lifted coating’, near a sleeve. The operator surmised the ‘lifted coating’ was installed after the original coating but before the 2016 coating. The lifted coating contained damage that occurred during the damage event that caused the loss of containment in 2018. Given the proximity of the damage on the lifted coating, the personnel excavating and installing the repair sleeves in November of 2016 most likely would have noticed any damage if it had occurred before the 2016 repair. Due to no reports of damage during excavation or sleeve installation, the damage that resulting in the loss of containment in 2018 most likely occurred during the 2016 backfill from a track hoe. This report is not included in the incident statistic summary because it was reported as Previous Damage Due to Excavation.



Figure 3: Previous Second Party Excavation Damage

5. Lackawaxen, PA Report #20170098

In October 2017, contractor crews punctured an existing pipeline while removing trench boxes from a road bore for a new pipeline in the operator’s pipeline easement. The contractor (second party) hit the existing pipeline five times without stopping the job to investigate the obstruction. The backhoe had unbarred teeth. Prior to the original excavation for the road bore, the operator reported that the One-call was notified and the existing line was marked. The marks were present but worn at the time of the incident. The contractor reportedly used pipeline markers to locate the pipeline instead of One-

call markings within the tolerance zone.

Contractor crews were unaware of the operator's Excavation Plan and were not trained on the relevant procedures. There was no oversight as required by the company's procedures when the pipeline was hit because the operator did not recognize that the contractor would be excavating to remove the trench boxes. The operator's contractor's excavation practices were not sufficient.



Figure 4: Puncture from Backhoe with Unbarred Teeth




Figure 5 - Back hoe bucket resting next to 24" pipeline




Figure 6 - Backhoe as located when struck 24" pipeline – shows relationship to trench box.

6. Austin, TX – Report # 20170243

In July 2017, a pipeline operator deviated from their original work plan. A stopple fitting was installed upstream of the pump station to stop the flow of oil to replace valve stems. After the work was completed and the line was restarted, the track hoe contract operator (second party) was directed to remove a 1" out-of-service conduit that was found during excavation for the stopple fitting. The conduit ran increasingly closer to the pipeline and the track hoe operator, using a 36" bucket, struck a TOR that protruded above the pipe. The failure resulted in a release of 2,084 barrels of crude oil from the 18" pipeline about 31 miles SE of Austin, TX. Highway 20 was closed and 14 families were evacuated and one sheltered in place. There were no injuries or fatalities.



The left photo shows the TOR that was struck. The field crews were unaware that there were TORs because they did not review recent ILI data. The right photo shows the conduit veering toward the pipe. The pipeline was in the operator's private ROW. A One-call notification was made but the locate marks were not visible. The excavation practices were not sufficient.



Figure 7: Excavation Damage to TOR



Figure 8: Conduit Veering Toward Pipe

7. Helena, AL Report # 20160391

On October 31, 2016, a pipeline operator's contractor struck their 36" pipeline near Helena, Alabama, releasing over 4,000 barrels of gasoline and resulted in a fire. There were nine contract workers onsite. The accident resulted in two fatalities and four injuries requiring hospitalization.



Figure 9 [Helena, AL](#)

The operator had previously installed TORs to allow for the injection and displacement of nitrogen during maintenance activities. The operator reported to PHMSA that their contractor (second party) struck a TOR during work to excavate the line to install a stopple fitting to facilitate repair of a previous pipeline failure from September 9, 2016. PHMSA's findings indicate that the root cause of the accident was that the contractor did not abide by appropriate operator written procedures for excavating around an active pipeline. The investigation identified numerous contributory causes of the rupture, including not having appropriate supervision or procedures to ensure safety during excavation activities. The investigation also found that the contractor continued excavating after the operator's inspector representative had left the site. [Link to NTSB Press Release.](#)





Regulatory Requirements to Prevent Excavation Damage:

Operators are required to have:

- Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies per Part 192.605, 195.402
- Written Damage Prevention Program per Part 192.614, 195.442
- Written Emergency Plan per Part 192.615, 195.402(e)
- Written Public Awareness Program per Part 192.616, 195.440
- Maps and records – 192.605(b)(3), 195.404(b)(1) Operators must have construction records, maps and operating history available to appropriate operating personnel to provide safety during maintenance and normal operations.
- PHMSA issued Advisory Bulletin [ADB-02-01](#), May 24, 2002 Notice to Operators of Natural Gas and Hazardous Liquid Pipelines to Encourage Continued Implementation of Safe Excavation Practices.

Operator and their contract excavators are generally subject to the same State one-call laws as third-party excavators, including excavations operators undertake for their own facilities and within their own ROW because there is the possibility for other underground structures and other underground utilities to be buried there.

State’s PHMSA deems as inadequate for enforcing damage prevention one-call laws:

On January 1, 2016, 49 CFR Part 196 became effective. The purpose of the rule is to encourage States to enforce their own one-call laws. PHMSA evaluates the adequacy of State one-call law enforcement programs on an annual basis. In States that do not adequately enforce their own excavation damage prevention laws, PHMSA has federal jurisdiction over excavators who damage regulated pipelines. 49 CFR 196 requires excavators to: Call 811 before they dig; wait for operators to mark their pipelines; excavate with care; call 811 again, if necessary; tell pipeline operators if there is damage to a pipeline; call 911 if there is a release of natural gas or hazardous liquids. PHMSA’s regulations do not take the place of State damage prevention law enforcement programs that are deemed inadequate. State one-call laws remain in effect and PHMSA encourages States to enforce their own laws.

II. AID Recommendations

Operators may need to look at new strategies to reduce first and second party damage. PHMSA believes that first-party and second-party damage is completely avoidable and when it occurs, operators’ procedures and/or practices have failed. In these instances, a thorough root cause failure analysis (RCFA) of the event is warranted. The results of the RCFA should be incorporated into the operators’ procedures, construction practices, and maintenance operations. The following are potential areas where inspectors can dig deeper into assessing an operator’s damage prevention program for first and second party damage:



Operator Excavation Damage Prevention – Focus Inward²

- Does the operator recognize the threat of first and second party damage?
- How do they focus on operator practices, including employee training, excavation and safety procedures, and contractor oversight to prevent damage?
- Do they apply the same level of oversight, and use the same procedures as they require for third parties?
- How do operators oversee excavation performed by their contractors?
- Does the operator ensure that company and contract personnel are properly trained for the tasks they are required to perform and are performing these tasks according to the appropriate guidelines?

Utilization of Information

- Does the operator provide information to their excavators (employees, construction, or contract and subcontract workers, etc.) on the importance of obtaining and utilizing current maps, field notes, and require them to always call One-Call prior to excavating?
- Does the operator always amend key drawings, maps, alignment sheets, as-builts and records to reflect any and all changes made in the field?
- Does the operator check in-line inspection data that includes locations and orientation of appurtenances such as valves, fittings, and taps against current drawings to ensure accuracy?
- Are maps of all underground facilities confirmed by appropriate locating?
- Is the operator maintaining accurate maps for dissemination to contractors and subs?
- Does the operator require contractors to always use One-Call Services?

Pre-Job Site Analysis & Review

- Are there administrative controls so the operator undertakes pre-job planning every time, and ensure personnel are using all available information including updated drawings, maps, and inspection data showing appurtenances such as valves, fittings and taps?
- Do they perform pre-job site safety analyses to identify potential risks and safety issues?
- Does the operator assess excavation activity by first and second parties as a site-specific activity with unique excavation challenges and its own potential risks?
- Are there engineering controls so the operator maintains adequate oversight of their facilities whenever equipment is digging?
 - Company personnel?
 - Contractor personnel?
- Does the operator have procedures requiring the use of a “spotter” whenever

² Some of this information is from [API's](#) PPTS Operator Advisory: Role of First and Second Party Damage in Excavation Incident, 2009.



excavation is performed?

- Does the spotter have and use a probe bar?
- Do they hold tailgate training sessions to cover excavation procedures, review risks, and disseminate this information to all company and contract personnel that will be working at the site?
- Do they modify the hazard assessment if site conditions and/or personnel change?
- Do they verify the adequacy of the available information such as in-field markings, markings related to third party One-Call response, pipeline alignment or facility drawings, in-line inspection information, etc.?

Evaluating Performance

- Contractor oversight programs may need to be included as part of an operator's assessment of the effectiveness of its excavation damage prevention program.
- Does the operator utilize data developed through near miss, incident reporting and investigations to encourage continual improvement to prevent recurrence?
- Do they collect performance metrics, industry benchmarking and perform frequent assessments of the results of the operator's damage prevention program?
- Does the operator utilize Common Ground Alliance (CGA) Best Practices?
- Do they perform gap analysis on their practices vs. CGA Best Practices?

III. Additional Resources

- PHMSA Stakeholder Communication Website -[Damage Prevention](#) and [Summary of State Damage Prevention Laws](#)
- [Common Ground Alliance](#) (CGA) Best Practices [Call 811](#)

Minutes –Burke / Caldwell Counties - NC 811 Meeting

January 15, 2020

Present:

Brian Morehouse – NC 811
Ralph Johnson – Brentwood Water
Robert Turner – Brentwood Water
Troy Houser – Brentwood Water
Max Chapman – Brentwood Water
Ken Suttles – Suttles Surveying
Doug Suttles – Suttles Surveying
David Poore – West Consultants
Tommy Chapman – REMC
Will Dennis – Town of Rhodhiss
David Wortman – Town of Rhodhiss
John Leger – Town of Rutherford College

Ronnie Suttles – City of Morganton
Roger Allen – City of Morganton
Trae Price – City of Morganton
Jeremy Hussey – USIC
Kevin Pritchard City of Lenoir
Derek Goble – City of Lenoir
Beth McMahan – City of Lenoir
Tracy Huffman – City of Lenoir
Michelle Flowers – NC Utilities Commission
Jennifer Henderson – Heath Consultants
Duane Spencer – Heath Consultants
Christopher Frye – Heath Consultants

The January 2020 Meeting was held on Tuesday, January 14, 2020 at 12:00 noon at the Timberwood Restaurant in Morganton, NC. The meeting was called to order by Ralph Johnson, Chairperson. Robert Turner offered a prayer of blessings on the meeting and meal.

It is noted in these minutes that we had 24 folks in attendance this month! This is the highest number to attend in several months. A Special thank you for making time in you schedule to attend this very informative meeting. Please come back next month!

Elections were held for selections of officers for the coming year of 2020. The following people were approved to serve:

- Chairperson: Ralph Johnson
- Vice Chairperson: Kenneth Suttles
- Secretary: Robert Turner

A complete listing of all stats for the previous month of December 2019 are included in the PowerPoint presentation attached to the email used to send these minutes out. Listed below is a highlight of ticket / transmission for December 2019:

Dec. 2019 vs 2018

Tickets

2019: 140,576
2018: 135,072
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Year-to-date

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Difference: 11.1%

Brian Morehouse Contact Information: Email at: bmorehouse@nc811.org. Cell Number is: 336-482-6890.

Listed below is the contact information for USIC & Piedmont Natural Gas Locators Supervisors for Burke and Caldwell Counties:

Burke County:	Daniel Breland, USIC -	704-441-4513
Caldwell County:	Jeremy Hussey, USIC -	704-441-4631
USIC:	Hugh Spinks (Area Supervisor)	773-619-3672
PNG:	Jennifer Henderson, Heath Consulting	980-613-1579

Listed below is the contact information for the: North Carolina Utilities Commission

Pipeline Safety Engineer:	Jennifer Flowers, P.E.
Mailing Address:	4325 Mail Service Center
	Raleigh, NC 27699-4300
Cell Phone:	919-418-4558
Fax Number:	919-733-7300
Email address:	mflowers@ncuc.net

Brian would like for us to remember to continue documenting any locating issues that might develop during the course of work during the coming months.

Michelle Flowers - NC Utilities Commission: Made a presentation on Underground Natural Gas lines safety and issues. A PDF file of her presentation for your records and information is attached to the email transmitting these minutes to you. **Please take the time to review these very important safety issues and the dangers involve when working around underground natural gas lines.**

SPECIAL REMINDERS:

- **Damage Reporting: Remember that if you damage an underground utility, it is your responsibility to report this damage to NC 811 UCC. Offices in Greensboro.**
- **Below is the website where you can go to communicate "Damage Violations".**
<https://www.nc811.org/report-a-violation.html>

Round-table Discussions:

Tommy Chapman – REMC: Tommy noted that in this time of very heavy rain and wet conditions, that REMC is using “Marker Flags rather than “Painting the ground” to mark their underground lines. The reason being that the paint is washing off because of the rain.

Will Dennis – Town of Rhodhiss: Nothing to report.

Ralph Johnson – Brentwood Water: Brentwood has completed the installation of new water lines on Lyle Road in the western part of the county. We continue to do system maintenance projects. Wintertime is good for us in that we do not have very many leaks during the winter months.

Ken & Doug Suttles – Suttles Surveying: Reports that the Powerhouse Road should reopen in the near future.

Jeremy Hussey – USIC – Caldwell County: The Facebook project in Caldwell County continue toward the Wilks County line. Nothing else to report.

John Leger – Town of Rutherford College: Nothing to report.

Kevin Pritchard – City of Lenoir: Nothing to Report.

Jennifer Henderson – Heath Consultants: The had a four-inch gas line cut yesterday in the Lenoir area. One line was marked correctly, and one line WAS NOT marked correctly. This created part of the problem.

We had **THREE** new members to join us at today’s meeting. **Beth McMahon** from the City of Lenoir in Caldwell County. And **Duane Spencer and Christopher Frye** of Heath Consultant in Caldwell County.

In closing, Brian would like for me to restate the importance of everyone getting all the facts on any damage that we have to our systems or that we may do to other companies’ systems. Document all problems and submit them to the proper authorities for proper actions.

We hope that you will tell others about the value of getting together to network and invite others to attend our next meeting which **will be held again on Tuesday, February 11, 2020 at 12:00 noon at the Timberwood Restaurant in Morganton.**

See you next month!!

Submitted by Robert Turner – Secretary